«Η Αμερική βοήθησε ακόμα και την εχθρό γερμανια όταν ηττήθηκε! Τώρα οφείλει να βοηθήσει την σύμμαχο Ελλάδα!»
Νέο ηχηρό χτύπημα Στίγκλιτς στο TIME όπου για πρώτη φορά καλεί ευθέως
τις ΗΠΑ να σώσουν την Ελλάδα. Ενώ τονίζει ότι η Ελλάδα μπορεί να
επιβιώσει χωρίς ΕΕ και ΔΝΤ.
Μιλά ευθέως για ένα νέο σχέδιο Μάρσαλ χωρίς όρους και δεσμεύσεις!
Ξεκαθαρίζει ότι η συνέχιση της λιτότητας μόνο δεινά θα επιφέρει
Διαβάστε ολόκληρο το εξαιρετικά ρηξικέλευθο άρθρο που παραπέμπει σε αυτά
που είχε δηλώσει ο Πάνος Καμμένος σε ανύποπτο χρονο και κάποιοι
χλεύασαν. Τώρα τα λέει ένας νομπελίστας παγκόσμιας εμβέλειας. If Greece continues with austerity, it would be depression without end As the Greek saga continues, many have marveled at Germany’s
chutzpah. It received, in real terms, one of the largest bailout and
debt reduction in history and unconditional aid from the U.S. in the
Marshall Plan. And yet it refuses even to discuss debt relief. Many,
too, have marveled at how Germany has done so well in the propaganda
game, selling an image of a long-failed state that refuses to go along
with the minimal conditions demanded in return for generous aid. The facts prove otherwise: From the mid-90’s to the beginning of the
crisis, the Greek economy was growing at a faster rate than the EU
average (3.9% vs 2.4%). The Greeks took austerity to heart, slashing
expenditures and increasing taxes. They even achieved a primary surplus
(that is, tax revenues exceeded expenditures excluding interest
payments), and their fiscal position would have been truly impressive
had they not gone into depression. Their depression—25% decline in GDP
and 25% unemployment, with youth unemployment twice that—is because they
did what was demanded of them, not because of their failure to do so.
It was the predictable and predicted response to the austerity. The question now is: What’s next, assuming (as seems ever more
likely) they are effectively thrown out of the euro? It’s likely that
the European Central Bank will refuse to do its job—as the Central Bank
for Greece, it should do what every central bank is supposed to do, act
as a lender of last resort. And if it refuses to do that, Greece will
have no option but to create a parallel currency. The ECB has already
begun tightening the screws, making access to funds more and more
difficult. This is not the end of the world: Currencies come and go. The euro is
just a 16-year-old experiment, poorly designed and engineered not to
work—in a crisis money flows from the weak country’s banks to the
strong, leading to divergence. GDP today is more than 17% below where it
would have been had the relatively modest growth trajectory of Europe
before the euro just continued. I believe the euro has much to do with
this disappointing performance. Managing the transition from the euro to the Greek euro may not be
easy, but Argentina and others have shown how it can be done. The
government would recapitalize the banks in the new currency, continue
with capital controls, restrict bank withdrawals, and facilitate the
transfer of money within the banking system from one party to another.
The money inside the banking system would be slightly discounted (i.e.
worth slightly less than cash—in the case of Argentina, the discount was
a few percentage points for ordinary transactions). Pensioners would
need to get special treatment. Meanwhile, Greece would begin the process of debt restructuring: Even
the IMF says that it’s absolutely necessary. The Greeks might take a
page from Argentina, exchanging current bonds for GDP-linked bonds,
where payments increase with Greece’s prosperity. Such bonds align the
incentives of debtors and creditors (unlike the current system, where
Germany benefits from the weaknesses in Greece). Greece can easily survive without the funds from the IMF and the
eurozone. Greece has done such a good job of adjusting its economy that,
apart from what it’s paying to service the debt, it has a surplus. It
isn’t even dependent on the IMF and the eurozone for foreign exchange:
At least before the most recent stranglehold that Greece’s creditors had
imposed, it was running a current account surplus of 1%—5% if we
exclude oil exports. (What it was buying abroad in imports was 1% less
than what it was selling in exports.) Especially if oil prices remain
low, and if its lower “new” exchange rate attracts more tourists and
encourages exports, it can weather the storm. After Argentina restructured its debt and devalued, it grew
rapidly—the fastest rate of growth around the world except for
China—from its crisis until the global financial crisis of 2008. Every
country is different. Economists debate about how responsive exports and
imports are to changes in exchange rates. Argentina benefited from a
large increase in exports as a result of the commodity boom. There are,
however, some striking similarities: Both countries were being strangled
by austerity. Both countries under the IMF programs saw rising
unemployment, poverty, and immense suffering. Had Argentina continued
with austerity, there would have just been more of the same. The
Argentina people rose up and said no. So, too, for Greece: If Greece
continues with austerity, it would be depression without end. The U.S. was generous with Germany as we defeated it. Now, it is time
for the U.S. to be generous with our friends in Greece in their time of
need, as they have been crushed for the second time in a century by
Germany, this time with the support of the troika. At a technical level,
the Federal Reserve needs to create a swap line with Greece’s central
bank, which—as a result of the default of the ECB in fulfilling its
responsibilities—will have to take on once again the role of lender of
last resort. Greece needs unconditional humanitarian aid; it needs
Americans to buy its products, take vacations there, and show a
solidarity with Greece and a humanity that its European partners were
not able to display. olympiada
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Τα σχόλια δημοσιεύονται με μια καθυστέρηση και αφού τα δει κάποιος από τη διαχείριση...και όχι για λογοκρισία αλλά έλεγχο για: μη αναφορά σε προσωπικά δεδομένα, τηλέφωνα, διευθύνσεις, προσβλητικά, υποτιμητικά και υβριστικά μηνύματα ή δεσμούς (Link) με σεξουαλικό περιεχόμενο.
Η φιλοξενία και οι αναδημοσιεύσεις άρθρων τρίτων, τα σχόλια και οι απόψεις των σχολιαστών δεν απηχούν κατ' ανάγκη τις απόψεις του ιστολογίου μας και δεν φέρουμε καμία ευθύνη γι’ αυτά. Προειδοποίηση: Περιεχόμενο Αυστηρώς Ακατάλληλο για εκείνους που νομίζουν ότι θίγονται προσωπικά στην ανάρτηση κειμένου αντίθετο με την ιδεολογική τους ταυτότητα ή άποψη, σε αυτούς λέμε ότι ποτέ δεν τους υποχρεώσαμε να διαβάσουν το περιεχόμενο του ιστολογίου μας.