ΑΠΟΚΛΕΙΣΤΙΚΟ Η ΕΚΘΕΣΗ ΤΟΥ ΔΝΤ.... Τα κάναμε μαντάρα με το πρόγραμμα της Ελλάδας..

Μήνυμα 1ο: Τα κάναμε μαντάρα.... 

Μήνυμα 2ο: Η συνεργασία με τις χώρες της Ευρωζώνης ήταν αδύνατη και αυτό είναι πραγματικά είναι σφάλμα που κάναμε.... 

Σε σχέση με το 1ο μήνυμα, υπάρχει μια δίκαιη δόση αυτομαστίγωσης... 

Αυτά λέει εν ολίγοις η πρόσφατη αναφορά του ΔΝΤ σχετικά με το πρόγραμμα της Ελλάδας...

Δείτε τα κύρια σημεία της αναφοράς που καταδεικνύουν ότι όντως τα έκαναν μαντάρα...και αποκαλύπτουν την πλήρη αποτυχία του προγράμματος



Ήξεραν από την αρχή το πρόβλημα του χρέους χρειαζόταν αναδιάρθρωση 
Given the danger of contagion, the report judges the program to have been a necessity, even though the Fund had misgivings about debt sustainability. There was, however, a tension between the need to support Greece and the concern that debt was not sustainable with high probability (a condition for exceptional access). In response, the exceptional access criterion was amended to lower the bar for debt sustainability in systemic cases. The baseline still showed debt to be sustainable, as is required for all Fund programs.

Το ταμείο παραδέχεται, επίσης, ότι υποτίμησε τις αρνητικές συνέπειες της λιτότητας και δεν έκρινε σωστά την ικανότητα της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης να παραδώσει γρήγορα διαρθρωτικές μεταρρυθμίσεις
 The report considers the broad thrust of policies under the program to have been appropriate. Rapid fiscal adjustment was unavoidable given that the Greece had lost market access and official financing was as large as politically feasible. Competivenessboosting measures were also essential, as were fiscal structural reforms to support deficit reduction. However, the depth of ownership of the program and the capacity to implement structural reforms were overestimated.

Αν έχετε παρακολουθήσει τις δηλώσεις ΔΝΤ κατά τα τελευταία χρόνια, τίποτε από αυτά δεν είναι πολύ περίεργο. Το πιο ενδιαφέρον σχετικά με το έγγραφο είναι το 2ο μήνυμα . Είναι εξαιρετικά (αλλά αρκετά) σκληρό για το ρόλο που διαδραματίζουν τα κράτη μέλη της ευρωζώνης. Στο κρίσιμο ερώτημα για το αν θα έπρεπε να υπάρξει μια έγκαιρη αναδιάρθρωση του χρέους, το δάχτυλο είναι στραμμένο προς τους Ευρωπαίους...

Yet in Greece, on the eve of the program, the authorities dismissed debt restructuring as a “red herring” that was off the table for the Greek government and had not been proposed by the Fund (Papaconstantinou, 2010). In fact, debt restructuring had been considered by the parties to the negotiations but had been ruled out by the euro area. There are a number of reasons for this: 

• Some Eurozone partners emphasized moral hazard arguments against restructuring. A rescue package for Greece that incorporated debt restructuring would likely have difficulty being approved, as would be necessary, by all the euro area parliaments.
• Debt restructuring would directly hurt the balance sheets of Greek banks. This would imply a call on the program’s financing that would exceed the amount set aside for bank recapitalization under the HFSF. 
• Debt restructuring risked contagion to other members of the Eurozone and potentially another Lehman-type event, yet the EFSF was not yet in place. European banks had large holdings of Greek bonds – but also, and of more concern given the scale of their exposure, had large holdings of the bonds of other European sovereigns that would drop in value were Greek creditors to be bailed in. For the euro zone as a whole, there might be limited gain in bailing in creditors who subsequently might themselves have to be bailed out.

Οι Ευρωπαίοι στη συνέχεια κατηγορούνται για κόλπα ενώ η Αθήνα καίγεται .. 

61. Nonetheless, the arrangement posed problems for program design. The Fund was required to negotiate first with the euro area countries (represented by the EC and ECB) and then with the Greek authorities. This had the advantage that the program would enjoy the necessary broader European support and that it would be consistent with euro area rules and norms. However, the Greek program was also subject to considerable uncertainty as the euro area policy response evolved. For example, the initial euro area position that debt restructuring was off the table was eventually reversed, although this took a considerable length of time. Similarly, there was an extended process before euro partners reached agreement on relaxing the fiscal stance. 

Τέλος, είναι σαφές ότι το ΔΝΤ θεώρησε ότι οι απαιτήσεις που καθορίζονται από την ΕΕ ήταν πολύ λεπτομερείς (το έγγραφο δεν χρησιμοποιεί τη φράση «μικρο-διαχείριση", αλλά είναι σαφές ότι αυτό εννοείται).  
Other lessons drawn concern the need to find ways to streamline the Troika process in the future and for Fund staff to be more skeptical about official data during regular surveillance. The detailed nature of the structural fiscal conditionality in the Greek program also bears scrutiny given the premium attached to parsimony in Fund conditionality 


Και διαπίστωσαν ότι είναι δύσκολο να συντονίσουν τα πράγματα με την ΕΚΤ και την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, επειδή :
62. There was no clear division of labor. Fund collaboration with the World Bank on country programs rests on an agreed division of labor. There was no such clarity in the assignment of responsibilities across the Troika. 

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